In his pioneering paper on “Performative Subordinate Clauses,” Lakoff (1984) claimed that subordinate clauses expressing a reason or concession allow imperatives conveying statements (i.e. assertive illocutionary force). While this analysis has gone unchallenged to this day, the present paper shows that Lakoff’s analysis is inadequate, in that reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative utterances they permit. Contra Lakoff, concessive clauses with although, though and except (that) do allow imperative constructions conveying directive illocutionary forces to occur, whereas by contrast those with even though tend to disallow both types of imperatives.

These findings can be explained in terms of compatibility between “component” constructions constituting a complex sentence. It is argued that the compatibility between imperatives (both directive and assertive types) and concessive adverbials (excluding even though) can be attributed to the latter’s loose integration into a matrix clause required by the former. Furthermore, it is argued that the incompatibility of even though with imperatives arises primarily from the incompatibility between the tight integration of even though and the loose integration required by imperatives, together with the associated incompatibility between the non-rectifying function of even though and the rectifying conjunction favored by imperatives.

This paper discusses English imperatives in subordinate clauses, with a special focus on those occurring in concessive clauses. [1] It is a received wisdom that the imperative normally occurs in main clauses. In fact, linguists have not paid much attention to imperatives used in subordinate clauses. The common (though not necessarily correct) assumption is that adverbial conjuncts in English such as if, when, because, and although are always followed by declaratives as in (1), but not by non-declarative sentences, as demonstrated in the oddity of each sentence in (2) below:

The basic supposition is straightforward. Non-declaratives are main clause phenomena and therefore should not be allowed in subordinate clauses.

In his 1984 paper, however, Lakoff contends that main clause phenomena including the imperative do occur in some adverbial subordinate clauses, and that when they occur they are restricted to those conveying statements. Consider:

While each sentence in (3) contains a because occurring with an imperative clause, only (3c) is acceptable. Sentences (3a) and (3b) are ruled out, because, according to Lakoff, only speech act constructions that conventionally express statements felicitously occur in because clauses. That is, the imperative utterance go home in (3a) or find out in (3b) is interpreted as a directive speech act. In contrast, the imperative consider which girl pinched me in (3c) is functionally a statement, because the because clause assumes that the addressee knows the answer to the question which girl pinched the speaker?. Lakoff generalizes that imperatives felicitously occurring in because clauses are those conventionally expressing statements such as (3c) as opposed to ordinary imperatives such as (3a) and (3b) (cf. Lakoff 1984: 476). More generally, he maintains that clauses expressing a reason or concession allow speech act constructions conveying statements (ibid: 479).

The present paper examines the validity of Lakoff’s generalization as it applies to the imperative in concessive adverbial clauses in naturally occurring data. Based on a survey of written materials taken from electronic corpora, the paper argues the following points. First, Lakoff’s analysis is inadequate, in that reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative clauses they permit. Contrary to Lakoff’s claim, concessive clauses with although, though, and except (that) do allow imperatives conveying directive illocutionary forces; imperatives do not need to convey assertive forces (or statements) to be felicitously embedded by concessive adverbials. Next, not all concessive clauses equally allow the imperative – even though does not as readily allow the imperative. Third, in conformity with Lakoff’s generalization, the types of imperative utterances permitted by reason clauses are those in assertive (= rhetorical) usage, although the verbs seem restricted to the class of “cognition verbs” such as consider, don’t forget, remember, and bear in mind.

This paper distinguishes itself from the previous literature in two important respects. First of all, it regards both the imperative and the adverbial subordinate clause as constructions – conventional patterns of linguistic structure imbued with features of interpretation and discourse function (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006; Diessel 2004). Second, the paper explains the possibility of embedding imperatives in terms of constructional compatibility, by exploring the view that the felicity of a complex construction crucially depends on the compatibility between its “component” constructions. Specifically, the discussions put forward the following points. First, imperatives, both ordinary and rhetorical, are permitted by the concessive adverbials (al)though and except (that), because the latter provide a conceptually independent environment required by the former. Rhetorical imperatives are permitted by reason adverbials, because they are less independent than ordinary (= non-rhetorical) imperatives. Even though clauses do not readily allow imperatives because of a serious clash in syntactic integration together with their discourse function. The even though clause is tightly integrated into, and solely serves to emphasize, a main clause, whereas the imperative clause demands a “loose” syntactic environment and prefers a concessive conjunction rectifying (as opposed to emphasizing) the content of a main clause.

Section 2 briefly surveys previous research. Section 3 deals with imperatives in concessive adverbial clauses. Section 4 discusses imperatives in reason clauses. Section 5 outlines the constructional approach of the present paper (5.1) and explains two main findings obtained in sections 3 and 4 in terms of constructional compatibility (5.2 and 5.3).

The traditional view holds that imperatives should not normally occur in subordinate clauses both in English and in other languages. In fact, most linguists have not paid serious attention to imperatives in subordinate clauses. According to Foley and Van Valin (1984: 249), for instance, “… the subordinate clause may not be independently specified for illocutionary force”; hence, the imperative kiss me does not occur with an adverbial clause:

In a similar vein, Sadock and Zwicky (1985: 174) point out that “imperatives tend not to occur as dependent clauses,” hence there are no clear examples of a marker of imperativity functioning as a complementizer. Crosslinguistic research reveals that in languages with distinct imperative morphology, the imperative is excluded from dependent clauses.

It is widely believed that whereas coordinate clauses are independent speech acts, (adverbial) subordinate clauses normally lack illocutionary force (cf. Haiman & Thompson 1984; Lehmann 1988: 193; Cristofaro 2003, among others). This belief persists even in a most recent reference grammar book such as Huddleston and Pullum (2002), who hold that imperatives are normally restricted to main clauses, so sentences like the following,

are “of somewhat marginal grammaticality” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 854).

Lakoff (1984) takes a significantly different perspective on this issue. He demonstrates that reason and concessive clauses do permit speech act constructions including inverted exclamations, wh-exclamations, rhetorical questions, tags as well as imperatives, all of which are “constructions that are restricted in their use to expressing certain illocutionary forces that are specified as part of the grammar of English” (Lakoff 1984: 473). Lakoff’s main claims directly relevant to the present paper can be summarized as follows. First, imperatives (and all the other speech act constructions) are permitted in reason (because, since) and concessive (although, though, except) clauses, but not in other adverbial clauses (such as conditional and temporal). Second, reason and concessive clauses can be subsumed under a single class of “reason clauses,” in that “concessive clauses give reasons for the opposite of the main clause” (cf. ibid: 479). That is, in “A although B”, B normally provides a reason for not A; to take an instance of John stayed up although he was tired, John’s being tired would be a reason for his not staying up.

Third, not all reason and concessive clauses permit imperatives (and other speech act constructions). Only those conveying statements permit them. Lakoff ultimately offers the following as a general principle:

Consider (3a), (3b) and (3c) again, repeated here for convenience as (7a), (7b) and (7c), respectively:

All these sentences contain an imperative beginning with a because. While both (7a) and (7b) are ruled out, only (7c) is acceptable because this sentence conveys a statement.

This analysis has gone unchallenged to this day, as evidenced by the fact that it is closely followed in a recent study by Verstraete (2005), who remarks that “coordinate” because and although as well as for impose rhetorical interpretations on non-declarative clause types (Verstraete 2005: 621):

The second sentence can be interpreted as communicating that “(I was just like getting by) because our expenses are very high,” which is functionally a statement. Just like Lakoff (1984), Verstraete assumes that to permit the imperative construction, for, because and although clauses must convey assertive illocutionary force, since “the speech act in the secondary clause is invariably assertive,” whereas the speech act in the main clause has no inherent restrictions (cf. Verstraete 2005: 621-622).

Lakoff offers a variety of (constructed) examples in which subordinate clauses beginning with although and except permit speech act constructions including inverted exclamations, tags, and rhetorical questions. However, he does not provide any example of these concessive clauses allowing imperatives to occur.

The next section deals with imperatives in concessive clauses and presents numerous counterexamples to Lakoff’s claim that imperatives must be functionally statements (i.e. in rhetorical use) to be permitted in reason and concessive clauses.

As we have observed above, according to Lakoff’s analysis (1984), imperatives permitted by concessive clauses should be those conveying statements or “assertive illocutionary force” (Verstraete 2005). However, Mizuno (2005, in preparation) presents a few counterexamples such as those in (9) and (10) below:

It is clear, as Mizuno observes, that the imperative please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner in (9) or don’t expect to see one in your local store in (10) is construed as conveying a directive speech act rather than a statement, hence it is non-rhetorical in function.

In fact, it is not particularly hard to find similar examples. Observe:

Here, the imperative verb reconsider is politely and seriously suggesting an action on the part of the recipient of this letter; hence it can be classified in terms of non-rhetorical use.

Other concessive adverbials such as except (that) and though also permit imperatives used non-rhetorically. [2] Such examples are typically found in written (notably, journalistic) discourse. This is at least partly due to the tendency that but constructions are predominant for the expression of concession in spoken language and the realization of concessive adverbials is relatively rare, although, of course, this does not mean that concessive adverbials do not occur in speech (cf. Barth 2000). [3]

Observe in (12) below the use of except clauses permitting imperative utterances:

It is clear that the imperatives don’t look in the Texas Family Code in (12a), please tell them that you knew me… (12b), and please insert the naughty c-word in (12c) as well as the imperative don’t tell Johnson that in (12d) convey directive illocutionary force, not an assertion. The imperative Just be yourself in (12e) is also interpreted as expressing advice or an instruction – it is hardly used rhetorically.

Though also readily permits the imperative, as illustrated below:

Just like although and except (that), the data involving embedded imperatives under though are of two types. In one case, the imperative combines directly with the concessive conjunction (cf. (13a-e)). In the other, the conjunction though combines with another adverbial clause (such as an if conditional), which includes an imperative as main clause (cf. (13f)). [4] In either case, the imperative clauses in these though clauses are used non-rhetorically; they are not interpreted as conveying statements at all.

Next, let us compare though with even though. While even though is sometimes treated as a mere emphatic form of though (cf. Quirk et al 1985: 1099; Schourup & Waida 1988: 203; Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 736), the two versions show a sharp contrast in the possibility of integrating the imperative. The above sequences containing a though clause become far less acceptable if even is added, as illustrated below:

In stark contrast with other concessive adverbials though, although, and except (that), even though generally disallows the imperative to occur.

So far, we have witnessed examples of concessive adverbials permitting ordinary (i.e. non-rhetorical) imperatives. It must be added that one can also find examples of concessive adverbials permitting imperatives expressing assertive force, as predicted by Lakoff’s 1984 analysis. The following is one such example with except that:

In this example, the imperative be aware is used rhetorically, serving as a reminder. In other words, the entire adverbial clause is functionally a statement, since it can be paraphrased as “The details don’t matter much, except that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.”

Note that in the context of (14), (al)though can readily replace except that:

However, even though cannot:

The same contrast in acceptability can be discerned between though and even though in the following constructed example of rhetorical imperative with the form don’t forget:

One may generalize then that even though tends to disallow the imperative construction – both in ordinary (non-rhetorical) and rhetorical use.

Let me summarize the findings in this section. First, contra Lakoff (1984) (as well as Verstraete 2005), concessive adverbial clauses permit not only rhetorical imperatives but also ordinary (= non-rhetorical) imperatives. Second, even though clauses tend to repel both rhetorical and ordinary imperatives.

This section discusses the use of imperative clauses embedded in reason clauses.

Lakoff (1984) offers one example of because permitting the imperative verb consider (example (3c) or (7c)). Verstraete (2005) provides an example of because with don’t forget (example (8) in the present paper). Similar examples can readily be found with the same verbs, as illustrated below:

In full conformity with both Lakoff’s and Verstraete’s prediction, these reason clauses are making statements rather than conveying directive forces. Sentence (16b), for example, can be paraphrased as a because clause followed by a declarative: “And the more access they have to weapons, the more likely they are to translate that depression and sadness, and in this boy’s case rage because most boys are taught it's better to be mad than to be sad.” [5]

As the examples below show, all the imperative verbs found in reason clauses in on-line corpora are what might be termed as “cognition verbs” (cf. Declerck 1991: 168). Included are remember, bear in mind, never forget, and believe (me):

Note that all these examples convey statements, with the imperative verb serving as a reminder. Some (or, in fact, many) of the imperative verbs above are parenthetically used – in particular, in (17a), (17b), (17f), and (17g). In short, Lakoff’s prediction (1984) is confirmed by naturally occurring data as far as reason adverbials are concerned, in that reason clauses permitting imperatives are those conveying statements (i.e. assertive illocutionary force). What is newly found here is the fact that the verb type is restricted to the one of “cognition verbs” that is in rhetorical use, as exemplified by consider and don’t forget as well as remember, bear in mind, never forget, and believe me.

The table below summarizes the main findings presented in sections 3 and 4.

As shown in this table, the first main finding is that concessive adverbial clauses with (al)though and except (that) allow both rhetorical and ordinary imperatives, quite unlike reason (i.e. because) clauses only allowing rhetorical (as opposed to ordinary) imperatives. The second finding is that, in stark contrast with other concessive clauses, even though does not readily combine with the imperative at all.

This section presents an account for each of these findings from the perspective of compatibility between constructions. Section 5.1 outlines a general idea of constructional compatibility involving a complex sentential expression. It is argued in section 5.2 that the first finding, i.e. the felicity of two types of imperatives under concessive adverbial clauses, can be explained as a case of compatibility between the former and the latter – the two are compatible in terms of syntactic independence. Next, in section 5.3, we explain the second finding, i.e. the difficulty of even though clauses to embed imperatives, as a case of incompatibility (or “clash”) between constructions. The two constructions do not merge because of a difference in conceptual integration, together with differences in their associated functional features.

The present paper has zeroed in on the possibility of subordinated imperatives under different concessive clauses. While Lakoff (1984) once proposed the view that clauses expressing reasons or concessions allow the imperative (and other kinds of speech act constructions) conveying statements, the paper has demonstrated that Lakoff’s analysis is not perfectly supported by actual data.

The main points presented in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, contra Lakoff (1984) (as well as Verstraete 2005), reason and concessive clauses differ sharply in the kinds of imperative constructions they permit. Concessive clauses with though, although, and except (that) allow imperative constructions conveying ordinary (directive) force as well as assertive (rhetorical) force. Second, quite unlike other concessive clauses, even though tends to disallow the imperative construction.

I have offered an explanation for each of these findings from the perspective of compatibility between component constructions constituting a complex linguistic structure. The first finding, i.e., the compatibility between concessive conjunctions and imperatives, was attributed to the compatibility in terms of looser clausal integration into a matrix clause. The second finding, namely, the difficulty of imperatives under even though clauses and imperatives, was ascribed to the incompatibility in degrees of clausal integration, and the related mismatch between the rectifying concession favored by imperatives and the non-rectifying concession of even though. [8]

In my analysis, I have argued that while one has to distinguish between reason and concessive adverbial clauses [9], one also needs to differentiate between different concessive adverbial clauses. Concessive conjunctions (al)though and except (that) differ greatly from even though both in conceptual integration and associated discourse functions. I hope that the findings made here will stimulate further research on the possibility of embedding imperatives, the types of linking adverbial clauses with main clauses, the controversies about coordination and subordination, and Construction Grammar.

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Submitted: 11.05.2007

Review results sent out: 19.07.2007

Resubmitted: 30.10.2007

Accepted: 16.11.2007